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Trans-Phobia and the Relational Production of
Gender
Elaine Craig*
In 1431, Joan of Arc, a nineteen-year-old cross-dresser, was burned
alive at the stake because she refused to stop dressing in men's clothing.'
Nearly six centuries later, in 2002, Gwen Araujo, a seventeen-year-old
male-to-female transsexual, was strangled to death by two men who later
claimed what can be described as a "trans panic defense" because they
hadn't realized that Gwen was biologically male before they had sex with
her.2 Individuals who transgress gender norms are among the most
despised, marginalized, and discriminated against members of many
societies. 3 A deep seated fear of transgender individuals reveals itself in a
plethora of contexts and across a wide spectrum of demographics. Perhaps
most disturbingly, intolerance towards and discrimination against
transgender individuals is found not only among the ranks of those whose
gender offers them opportunity and privilege, but also among those whose
own gender identity and expression has been a source of oppression and
persecution. To reduce or eliminate the discrimination against, and
oppression of, those whose gender is nonconformative, it is important to
understand why it is that gender transgression in others is experienced by
many people as so disruptive.
* Part-time Faculty, Dalhousie Law School, J.S.D. Candidate, Dalhousie Law School,
LL.B., Yale Law School, L.L.M, University of Alberta, B.A. Many thanks to Eric Berndt,
Devon Peavoy, Beth Ebers, Janice Forman, Juliette Nicolet, and Ron Levy. Thanks also to
Richard Devlin and Ronalda Murphy at Dalhousie for their exceptional feedback, and thank
you to Vicki Schultz at Yale for her guidance and encouragement.
1. LESLIE FEINBERG, GENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO
DENNIS RODMAN 31 (Beacon Press 1996).
2. Carolyn Marshall, 2 Guilty of Murder in Death of A Transgender Teenager, N.Y.
TIMES, September 13, 2005, at A20, col. 1.
3. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social
and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 256-60 (2005) (where he reports that transgender people are
disproportionately the victims of hate crime and disproportionately disadvantaged in terms
of housing and healthcare as a result of the employment discrimination that they face).
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I. INTRODUCTION: TRANS-PHOBIA: THE FEAR OF GENDER
TRANSGRESSORS
4
Knowing one's place in the social order, whether that place is one of
relative privilege or not, serves two psychologically ameliorative functions.
It relieves one from the "anxiety of [gender] identity interrogation ' 5 and it
helps to inform one as to the socially agreed upon, acceptable conduct for
interpersonal exchanges - the episteme of social interaction. This Paper
will demonstrate that gender identity is produced through relational,
contextually influenced, interpretative processes. Because gender is
constructed in societies which strongly embrace static, binary conceptions
of gender, and in which social, familial, occupational, and sexual
4. Due to the advent of new terminology and the reclamation of previously denigrating
or pathologizing terminology, there has historically been confusion and a lack of clarity as
to the meaning of many of the terms used in discussions concerning transgender issues.
Transgender is often used as an umbrella term to describe a variety of gender diversities. I
use the terms "transgender," "gender transgressor," "nonconformative gender" and "gender
nonconforming" interchangeably to indicate a wide variety of people whose gender does not
conform in some respect to the gender traditionally associated with the biological sex
assigned to that person at birth. I include within this category people who identify or live
some or all of the time as a gender other than the one with which their biological sex is
traditionally associated: intersex people (individuals born with reproductive or genital
anatomy which does not fit typical definitions for male or female), transsexuals (male to
female (MTF) and female to male (FTM) individuals who undergo or contemplate
undergoing anatomical and/or hormonal modifications in order to live in and be recognized
as a sex other than the one assigned at birth), cross-dressers (often referred to as
transvestites), genderqueers (individuals who do not identify as male or female or whose
gender identity is not always male or female), individuals who identify as "masculine
women" or "feminine men," and Two-Spirited individuals (often referred to as "berdaches,"
a term used by European colonizers to label aboriginal persons who did not fit their
conception of a "normal" man or woman). By the term gender identity I refer to one's
internal sense of being a man or woman or some variation thereof. By the term gender
expression I refer to the expressive manifestation of one's gender identity - the outwardly
observable activities, gestures, behaviors and attitudes culturally associated with gender
signifiers. By the term gender I refer to the social-psychological construct that designates
how persons are categorized by others and how they categorize themselves in terms of
masculine and/or feminine and/or some derivation or combination thereof. The choice in
terminology used in this paper reflects my understanding of how individuals within these
communities self-identify. The meanings of the terms feminine and masculine and man and
woman are themselves socially constructed, contested and often contextually variable. I
self-consciously employ them because it is difficult to examine the implications of the
manner in which gender is produced without using this language.
5. This phrase is borrowed from Professor Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of
Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv. 353, 362 (2000). In this work Yoshino argues that
bisexuals pose an identity threat both to heterosexuals and gays and lesbians, and that this
serves as one of the factors motivating both groups to render bisexuality invisible. Id.
Yoshino borrows from Mary McIntosh who, in a pre-Butler, pre-Foucault examination of
the social construction of sexuality, suggests that both heterosexuals and homosexuals are
invested in conceptualizing homosexuality as a condition, "[flor just as rigid categorization
deters people from drifting into deviancy, so it appears to foreclose on the possibility of
drifting back into normality and thus removes the element of anxious choice." Mary
McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOC. PROBS. 182, 184 (1968).
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interactions are heavily influenced by gendered social scripts, gender
expressions which are ambiguous, or which have changed since a prior
interaction, or which are strongly incongruent with normative
understandings of the correlation between gender and biology, are typically
experienced by others as at least uncomfortable, and often actually
disruptive. The dominant social response to disruption is an ultimately
futile effort to reinforce a gender binary. The law is frequently invoked in
aid of this re-inscription of gender. In this Paper I argue that the disruption
is produced by the binary model itself, and I propose legal strategies which
will assist in a re-conceptualization of gender.
In order to reduce the disruption experienced as a result of this
uncertainty, static or binary understandings of gender must be re-
conceptualized. Law is a critical location of re-conceptualization. Legal
approaches that will assist in instigating such a re-conceptualization include
the elimination of unnecessary gender designations on legal documents
such as birth certificates and the adoption of litigation strategies that
critically challenge the necessity of gender designations in particular
contexts, rather than simply asserting individual gender identity claims.
Gender transgressions are experienced as uncomfortable or disruptive
for two interrelated and mutually compounding reasons. Gender
transgression in others disrupts the processes through which one
understands one's own gender within a given context, interaction, and role,
because of the dominant paradigm within which gender is currently
understood in this society, in conjunction with the relational, interpretive
manner in which gender identity is produced. The disruption experienced
because of this uncertainty is compounded by the gendered nature of a
great number of the social scripts that govern interpersonal interactions.
Gender transgressions disrupt the episteme of "appropriate" social
interaction because interpersonal interactions are so greatly influenced and
governed by these gendered scripts. This disruption of social scripts that
inform interpersonal interactions, often experienced as "not knowing how
to behave" in what would usually be considered routine social interactions,
is then compounded by the disruption to one's own gender identity created
by these transgressions. People react negatively, fearfully, and
discriminatorily in the face of nonconformative gender presentation
because the uncertainty it creates makes them feel uncomfortable - both
uncomfortable about themselves and uncomfortable about how to "act."
Presently, social and legal efforts to address the disruption created by
these uncertainties often revolve around attempts to artificially stabilize
gender categories and reinforce a binary gender order. Unfortunately, these
efforts only serve to perpetuate the social processes through which gender
transgression becomes experienced by others as disruptive. It is not the
relational development of self-understandings that perpetuates trans-
phobia. The problem stems from the false construct of gender that our
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relational efforts have been socially programmed to try, in vain, to
maintain. Current conceptions of gender demand from our relational
processes affirmation of an understanding of gender that does not reflect
reality, and as a result, gender transgressions of all sorts are often
experienced as disruptive. The degree of trans-phobia prevalent in our
society will be reduced by lessening the cognitive dissonance people
experience in the face of gender transgression. Adopting a more nuanced
conceptualization of gender will reduce this cognitive dissonance; this will
result in an understanding that recognizes its fluidity and relational nature.
The difficulty, of course, is that the binary gender order in our society is
continually and significantly reinforced both through cultural norms and
through legal infrastructure.
So, how can the law be used to instigate a re-conceptualization of
gender in our society? The most effective reforms aim to be constitutive;
they seek to shape and transform personal identity. For example, a person
who has begun to perceive of themselves as environmentally friendly is
much more likely to diligently recycle and compost their household waste.
Although it is unlikely that legal reform will have everyone perceiving
themselves as transgender anytime soon, nor is it necessary, legal reforms
which reduce and eliminate unnecessary gender designations could be
deployed to create more nuanced and fluid understandings of gender. Sex
designation and distinction, and concomitantly gender designation and
distinction,6 in our legal system are pervasive. While there are contexts
that may legitimately require sex and/or gender distinctions, there are
others in which it is unnecessary. The relevance of the designation of sex
should be critically challenged in an effort to distinguish between those
contexts in which such designation serves a legitimate function and those in
which it occurs simply because of habit, practice, tradition or for some
more nefarious purpose. In those contexts where its utility is questionable,
legal gender designations and/or distinctions should be eliminated. Both
the process of re-evaluating the pervasive and unchallenged designation of
gender, by creating a discourse in which we question the relevance of
gender to a particular context, as well as the end result of such re-
evaluation, would contribute to a de-emphasis and corresponding re-
conceptualization of gender.
6. Both traditionally, and contemporarily as well, with the exception of some very
recent anti-discrimination statutes and jurisprudence, legal distinctions premised on
categorization by sex, are done so with the underlying assumption that sex is determinative
of gender. Correspondingly, because of such assumptions, legal designations of sex are
often perforce defacto legal designations of gender.
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II. THE INTERPRETIVE, RELATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO
THE PRODUCTION OF GENDER
Dressed as I am in jeans and sweater, I have no idea to which sex
the policemen will suppose me to belong, and must prepare my
responses for either decision. I feel their silent appraisal down the
corridor as I approach them, and as they search my sling bag I
listen hard for a "Sir" or a "Ma'am" to decide my course of
conduct.
In large measure intolerance towards transgender individuals stems
from a discomfort, almost universally experienced, when one is confronted
with someone whose gender is, in some respect, less stable or ascertainable
than one's own. This discomfort with gender ambiguity, uncertainty and
instability may be explained in part by the relational, interpretive manner in
which gender is created. Identities, including gender identities, develop not
only through internal biological and psychological processes but also
through interactions with people, cultures and environments.
A. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER
Judith Butler, noting historical and anthropological work that
understands gender "as a relation among socially constituted subjects in
specifiable contexts," observed that, "what gender 'is,' is always relative to
the constructed relations in which it is determined.",8 Butler went further,
suggesting that not only is there "a radical discontinuity between sexed
bodies and culturally constructed genders," but moreover, gender
designates "the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves
are established." 9 As a result, she argued, "gender is not to culture as sex is
to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed
nature' or a 'natural sex' is produced and established as
'prediscursive'...",o One of Butler's central claims is that sex is as
culturally constructed as gender, and that as such, "the distinction between
sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all."'"
Paradoxically, Butler's work simultaneously attenuates the identity
claims of many transgender, in particular transsexual, individuals. While
her conception of gender as a social construct, and its corresponding
disaggregation of gender and biological sex, supports the legitimacy of
7. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURAL
ANXIETY 1 (Routledge 1992) quoting JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM: AN EXTRAORDINARY
NARRATIVE OF TRANSSEXUALISM 110 (Henry Holt & Co. 1986) (1974).
8. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
14-15 (Routledge, 1999) (1990).
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id.
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transgender claims asserting incongruity between sex assigned at birth and
gender identity, Butler also privileges those transgender individuals who
choose to remain ambiguous in their gender presentation over those who
attempt to resolve, through surgical or other means, the dysphoria they
experience between their gender identity and their material being. She
does so by distinguishing between transgender transgressions, which
evidence the gender-sex split that she articulates, 12 and "transsexual
capitulation to 'hegemonic constraint,,,1'3 which she insinuates results from
a society that conflates genitals with gender.' 4 Terry S. Kogan observes
that gender theorists such as Butler have argued "[f]or a transsexual to
insist on a correspondence between his gender identity and his sex is to
adopt an essentialist view that there is a necessary tie between a person's
sexed body (as male or female) and a person's gender."' 5 Although the
split between biological sex and gender experienced by many transfolk
may indeed evidence the constructedness of sex and gender, some scholars
argue that it is inappropriate to herald transgenderism as the subversive
poster child for the sex-gender split because it denies the pursuits and
claims of the many transsexual individuals who very much aspire to the
"real;" these are individuals who "seek very pointedly to be non-
performative, to be constative, quite simply to be.'
16
B. INCORPORATING A MATERIAL PERSPECTIVE
The aim of this work is not to challenge many transsexual (or
transgender) individuals' strongly held convictions as to the immutability
of their core gender identity; nor is its aim to embark upon the infinitely
regressive path towards deconstructing embodiment. Although Butler's
ground-breaking work on the social construction of gender is essential to
understanding the processes through which gender as a whole is produced,
at the same time, people do experience their bodies and they often
experience them in a very material sense. 17  Indeed, these experiences
12. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX"
126-27 (Routledge 1993).
13. JUDITH HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME AND PLACE: TRANSGENDER BODIES,
SUBCULTURAL LIVES 51 (New York University Press 2005) [hereinafter QUEER TIME].
14. BUTLER, supra note 12, at 51. For a discussion of this argument, see
HALBERSTAM, supra note 13, at 51.
15. Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a
Restroom Labeled "Other, " 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1229 (1997).
16. See Jay Prosser's critique of Butler's examination of the film Paris is Burning, in
JAY PROSSER, SECOND SKINS: THE BODY OF NARRATIVES OF TRANSSEXUALITY 45-55
(Columbia University Press 1998).
17. This is not an assertion that constructivists such as Butler would necessarily
dispute. While perhaps often misconstrued by readers, Butler does not deny the existence of
embodiment. "Every time I write about the body, the writing ends up being about language.
This is not because I think the body is reducible to language; it is not. Language emerges
from the body, constituting an emission of sorts. The body is that upon which language
falters, and the body carries its own signs, its own signifiers, in ways that remain largely
[Vol. 18:2
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become part of the interpretive processes through which gender identity is
created. This is not to suggest however, that the corporeal experience is
solely, or even predominantly, biologically determined. "[T]he biological
and the social interact; chance, choice and determination interact;
childhood learning and adult life interact; symbols and the material worlds
interact. Even words like 'perversion' and 'normality' interact in everyday
worlds. And in this interactive process, of course, new forms emerge."'
' 8
In an effort to avoid, if not reconcile, the tension between these claims
of social construction and material corporeal experience, it is instructive to
emphasize the interpretive and the interactive elements of the production of
gender. It is instructive because it allows for a productive relationship
between the social and the material. The application of an interpretive,
symbolic optique, such as the one outlined below, may be more conducive
to grounding "social life, subjectivities, discourses and bodies together,"' 19
than is possible from a purely constructivist perspective.
C. SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND THE ESSENCE OF GENDER
Based on the notion that human beings have an evolved capacity for
communication through symbols and an ability to "reflect internally upon
their actions," George Herbert Mead developed a view of society as an
interpretive process. Mead, a social psychologist, argued that we develop a
shared set of concepts and values in the course of socialization through
"taking the role of other." 20  He suggested that "[i]f we abandon the
conception of a substantive soul endowed with the self of the individual at
birth, then we may regard the development of the individual's self, and of
his self-consciousness within the field of his experience. ... ,,21 Building
on Mead's theories, sociologist Herbert Blumer first named the theory
"symbolic interactionism." Mead's understanding of society as an
interpretive process, and Blumer's theory of symbolic interactionism, focus
on the interpretive elements of the social production of meaning in a
manner less emphasized under Butler's theory of gender performativity.
Symbolic interactionism rests on the following premises:
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the
basis of the meanings that the things have for them .... The
second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from,
or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's
unconscious." JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 198 (Routledge 2004).
18. Ken Plummer, Queers, Bodies and Postmodern Sexualities: A Note on Revisiting
the "Sexual" in Symbolic Interactionism, 26 QUALITATIVE Soc. 515, 524 (2003).
19. Id. at 526.
20. Max Travers, Symbolic Interactionism and Law, in AN INTRODUCTION To LAW
AND SOCIAL THEORY 209, 210 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002).
21. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 1 (University of Chicago Press 1934).
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fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in,
and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in
dealing with the things he encounters.
... [S]ymbolic interactionism sees meanings as social products,
as creations that are formed in and through the defining activities
of people as they interact.
22
Arising from this theory is the notion that "society is in a constant state
of evolution and flux." 23 While the focus of Blumer's work was on the
development of social institutions, his theory has ontological implications
for the social development of self-understandings as well.24 If society and
social meaning is in a constant state of flux as a result of the interpretive
and interactive manner in which social meaning is produced, and if social
meaning plays such a constitutive role in the formation of gender identity
(as gender theorists would argue), then as people interact with and interpret
each other, and their material environments (including their physical
beings), it follows that individual identity will also be in a continual state of
potential change.
What then of the many transfolk (and non-transfolk) who irrefutably
experience their gender as immutable? An essentialist element to one's
gender identity, regardless of whether that identity conforms to culturally
prescribed understandings as to the "appropriate genitals" for said identity,
is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that gender is produced
relationally through interpretive processes. "[C]onstructivism claims that
important features of human beings and our world are contingent, historical
products of human activity and interaction, but it does not claim that
anything it describes as socially constructed would be easy, or even
possible, to change., 25  Symbolic interactionism does not dismiss the
existence of certain recurrent and habitualized features to our ongoing
interactions and interpretations - features that I would argue contribute to
both the scripts that guide our interpersonal interactions and the manner in
which gender identity is often experienced as immutable. While nature is
considered the paradigmatic source of "true essence," it is possible to
26distinguish essentialism from pure biological causation. As Professor
22. HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 2, 5
(Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1969).
23. Travers, supra note 20, at 210.
24. For a discussion of the application of the theory of symbolic interactionism in the
context of sexuality, see Plummer, supra note 18, at 515.
25. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 552 (1994).
26. Id. at 547. Halley distinguishes between claims of weak essentialism
("attribution of any irreducible and therefore constitutive characteristic, regardless of its
[Vol. 18:2
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Janet E. Halley suggests "[a]ny attribution of an irreducible, constitutive
characteristic to a person or a thing attributes to it an essence. 27
Acknowledging the construction of social meaning through
contextually influenced, interpretive, interpersonal processes does not per
se exclude the possibility that some element of this process is essential,
constitutive of the individual and even experienced as immutable. The
existence of such an essence does not necessarily conflict with the notion
that one's sense of "being a man" or "being a woman" or "being queer" is
somewhat fluid, nor does it disrupt the idea that its flow is contextually
driven by the particular social role one is performing, the manner in which
one interprets a given environment, and the gender expressions of those
with whom one is interacting. Because gender plays such a significant part
in informing understandings of social roles, one's sense of femininity or
masculinity is likely to shift at least somewhat as one moves, for example,
from the role of mother to the role of boss or lover, or as one leaves the
office and heads to a sporting event, bar, or courtroom. Nor is the
existence of such an essence antipodean to the assertion that one's
performance or expression of masculinity and/or femininity may vary
depending on context. Indeed, if one's gender identity varies somewhat
depending on context, it follows that one's expression of gender would also
be contextually influenced. Isn't it almost axiomatic to suggest that my
gender expression will be different when I am at home with my lover than
when I am at work as a correctional officer? The same gender expression
will also vary from when I am out for lunch with my grandfather. At the
risk of reifying or capitulating to anachronistic gender stereotypes, one
need only observe two butch dykes do the stutter step trying to figure out
which one should open a door to realize that there is some relational
element to the expression of gender.28 Perhaps an essential element to
gender, experienced by some as an immutable sense of self, may govern
the manner of and degree to which one's gender varies, but not the fact that
it varies.
source") and claims of strong essentialism ("attribution of such a characteristic that is also
natural and biological"). Halley, supra note 25 at 548. Under Halley's paradigm, the claim
that I am making would be one of weak essentialism with an imbricating constructivist
assertion involving the proposition that self-understandings about gender arise, in part,
through interactions with other gendered beings.
27. Halley, supra note 25, at 547.
28. This point, while offered with tongue somewhat in cheek, illuminates one of the
shortcomings of the analysis posited here. See note 1 for a discussion of the inherent
limitations to the use of terminology necessarily employed in discussing these concepts; the
shortcoming pertains to the difficulty of advancing this theory without reifying stereotypical
gender roles.
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D. RELATIONALLY DEVELOPED SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS OF GENDER
In describing gender, writer and gender activist Riki Wilchins states:
[O]f all the things we have to say to each other, first and foremost
among them is our gender. It's the reason we dress as we do every
morning, style our hair specific ways, stand and walk and gesture
and inflect our voices the way we do .... In fact, throughout our
entire waking lives we are carrying on a continuous nonverbal
dialogue with the world, saying, "This is who I am, this is how I
feel about myself, this is how I want you to see me."29
Wilchins contends that this is not a one way dialogue. She suggests
that the world is talking back, telling us "[n]o, no - this is how we see
you, this is how you should feel about it, this is who you can be."3 ° With
respect to gender, much of the information an individual receives back
from the world is delivered via interactions with, and interpretations of,
other individuals' gender expressions. This exchange, what Wilchins
describes as a continuous nonverbal conversation, and what might also be
articulated as one form of symbolic interactionism, plays a significant role
in the production of gender both individually as manifested in our self-
understandings and macrocosmically as social understandings and
meanings of gender.
The constant production of gender through these relational, interpretive
processes results in context specific self-understandings; as a result, gender
identity, and consequently, gender expression, varies depending on where
we are, with whom we are interacting, and what, in particular, we are
doing. An overt example of this process is demonstrated by the manner in
which many transsexual individuals understand their gender. There is often
a conscious recognition, on the part of transsexual individuals, that the
manner in which they are perceived by the world has a significant impact
on how they perceive their own gender.31 Autobiographical literature
includes claims that transpeople often have a high degree of awareness as
to the intricacies of gender presentation. 32 "Transsexuals are keenly aware
of what it means to present oneself as a woman," and often come to the
conclusion that while one's posture, gait and gesturers play an integral role
in one's gender presentation, what is perhaps most important is one's
29. Riki Wilchins, A Continuous Nonverbal Communication, in GENDER QUEER:
VOICES FROM BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 12 (Joan Nestle, et al. eds., Alyson Books
2002).
30. Id.
31. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 15, 26 (2003).
32. See FEINBERG, supra note 1; see also KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON
MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF US (Routledge 1994).
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"interactions with others in the culture." 33 Judith Halberstam provides a
self-account of growing up as a tomboy that illuminates the significant
impact that one's interactions with people and culture can have on the
development and maintenance of one's gender identity:
For a large part of my life, I have been stigmatized by a
masculinity that marked me as ambiguous and illegible. Like
many other tomboys, I was mistaken for a boy throughout my
childhood, and like many other tomboy adolescents, I was forced
into some semblance of femininity for my teenage years. When
gender-ambiguous children are constantly challenged about their
gender identity, the chain of misrecognitions can actually produce
a new recognition: in other words, to be constantly mistaken for a
boy, for many tomboys, can contribute to the production of a
masculine identity. It was not until my mid-twenties that I finally
found a word for my particular gender configuration: butch ....
Susan Keller's discussion analogizing transsexual identity strategies, as
she describes them, to the rhetorical strategies employed by judicial
decision makers, also illuminates the relational manner in which gender
identity is produced.35 Keller suggests that "judges construct their own
identity while interpreting the identity claims of transsexuals. 36 This can
be observed, according to Keller, in judicial attempts to "maintain and
shore up a coherent ideology of gender" when adjudicating the claims of
transsexual litigants.37 She argues that the methods used by judges to
repudiate transsexual litigants' claims about gender, in order to maintain a
consistent ideology of gender, parallel the "repudiating identity strategies
of some post-operative transsexuals who 'erase' their pasts. 38 Keller's
analysis of the manner in which courts, by repudiating transsexuals'
identity claims and thus placing them on the outside, help to constitute the
identity of those left inside, demonstrating how understandings of gender,
and identity more generally, can be produced relationally. "The
exteriorization of the 'contaminated' other helps define both the boundary
between the interior and exterior and, through opposition, the qualities of
the privileged interior position. 39  Keller notes that Western society's
33. Kogan, supra note 15, at 1228.
34. Judith Halberstam, An Introduction to Female Masculinity: Masculinity Without
Men, in THE MASCULINITY STUDIES READER 355, 365 (Rachel Adams & David Savran eds.,
Blackwell Publishers 2002) [hereinafter Female Masculinity].
35. Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and
Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 332 (1999).
36. Id. at 338.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 367-68.
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gender ideology is based on an unquestioned overarching assumption that
every human being is either male or female.40  This gender ideology
provides judges attempting to make decisions concerning the gender
identity of others with "a degree of confidence and certitude that is self-
constitutive of the decision maker.",4' When judges rely upon this gender
ideology in deciding claims by transsexual litigants, they simultaneously
comment on and help to construct not only transsexual identity, but their
own identity as self-assured interpreters of gender.42 Keller argues:
Gender attribution at once helps construct the person about whom
the attribution is made and, less obviously, the person making the
attribution. When we confidently attribute gender, particularly
when we purport to discover the "true" gender in cases of
ambiguous visual clues, we assert our own position within society
as someone capable of making such claims about others. Such an
assertion does not seem like much of an identity statement only
because we regularly assume that everyone is capable of making
such distinctions. However, the centrality of this capacity to our
own sense of identity is revealed in the intense discomfort
generated by those occasions in which we feel unable to
distinguish, or in which we believe a prior attribution has been
demonstrated to be incorrect.43
E. RELATIONALLY DEVELOPED SOCIAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF
MASCULINE AND FEMININE
The production of gender through relational processes occurs on both
an interpersonal/individual basis and on an inter-group/societal level. On a
societal level these relational interpretive processes create contextually
specific cultural meanings for the concepts of feminine and masculine,
meanings that then interact with and influence individual conceptions about
gender. Halberstam's work on what she describes as "female masculinity"
articulates one relational process that contributes to cultural understandings
of masculine and feminine; she observes the numerous ways in which
female masculinity has been blatantly ignored both culturally and within
academic studies of masculinity.44 She suggests that "[t]his widespread
40. Keller, supra note 35, at 339.
41. Id. at 341.
42. Id. at 339.
43. Id. at 341-42.
44. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 360-62. "Female
masculinity" is a term Halberstam employs to describe her gender identity. It may be that,
rather than extending understandings of masculinity to non-male bodies, or creating new
taxonomies of masculinity, more would be achieved towards the pursuit of tolerance for
gender transgression by critiquing assumptions and understandings about what is and is not
"masculine." Regardless, Halberstam's work is of heuristic utility in exploring the
relational processes through which social meanings about gender are created.
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indifference to female masculinity ... has clearly ideological motivations
and has sustained the complex social structures that wed masculinity to
maleness and to power and domination. '45 While Halberstam's work is
devoted to the assertion that masculinity should be deregulated or extended
to non-male bodies, 46 her analysis also supports the proposition that
understandings of "masculinity" are produced through relational processes
between actors. Halberstam suggests that as a society, we spend significant
amounts of time and money ratifying and supporting the versions of
masculinity we enjoy and trust; she asserts that many of these "heroic
masculinities" depend in large measure on the subordination of what she
describes as "alternative masculinities. ' '47 In proposing the possibility of
alternative masculinities, such as "female masculinity" and "queer
masculinity," Halberstam argues that, "female masculinity," rather than
simply an imitation of maleness, "actually affords a glimpse into how
masculinity is constructed as masculinity. 48  Halberstam suggests that
"female masculinities are framed as the rejected scraps of dominant
masculinity in order that male masculinity may appear to be the real
thing. '49 To illustrate her point, Halberstam discusses the James Bond
movie Goldeneye. She suggests that in Goldeneye, the masculinity of
James Bond - the classic male hero - "appears as only a shadow of a
more powerful and convincing alternative masculinity., 50  Halberstam
argues that in Goldeneye, masculinity is produced as much through the
film's portrayal of Bond's boss, M, a discernibly butch woman and through
its portrayal of Agent Q[ueer], the campy science geek who provides Bond
with all the gadgets that help to establish Bond's own (what Halberstam
suggests is an unnatural and prosthetic) masculinity, as it is through the
film's portrayal of the heroic Bond himself.5' "The gay masculinity of
Agent Q and the female masculinity of M provide a remarkable
representation of the absolute dependence of dominant masculinities on
minority masculinities. 52  Halberstam claims that integral to the
construction of mainstream conceptions of masculinity are representations
of alternative, subordinated masculinities. If Halberstam is correct that the
invisibility of female masculinity vis i vis male masculinity functions to
perpetuate the automatic association of power and dominance with
maleness, then concomitantly, stemming from the dominant dyadic
45. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 356.
46. Judith Halberstam, Oh Bondage Up Yours! Female Masculinity and the Tomboy,
in CURIOUSER: ON THE QUEERNESS OF CHILDREN 191, 192 (Steven Bruhm & Natasha Hurley
eds., University of Minnesota Press 2004) [hereinafter Oh Bondage].
47. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 355-57.
48. Id. at 355.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 356.
51. Id. at 357.
52. Id.
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understanding of gender, this same process presumptively attaches the
inverse of power and dominance - powerless and submissive - to
femaleness. Thus, through the interrelationship of representations of
masculinity with representations of femininity, cultural understandings of
what it means "to be a man" or "to be a woman" are produced.53
Just as relations with, and contextually driven interpretations of, others'
gender expressions serve a role in producing both self and societal
understandings about masculinity and femininity, so too do groups produce
understandings as to what gender means in the context of a particular
group, via the group's historical relationships to, interactions with, and
interpretations of, other groups. An example of this phenomenon is
demonstrated by the relationship between gay and lesbian communities and
transgender communities.
In Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law, Andrew
Sharpe observes that the nineteenth century study of same-sex oriented
subjects, and their characterization as inverts, inaugurated the field of
sexology, and with it widespread medical, legal, and cultural
understandings of homosexuality and transgenderism. 54 He suggests that
"[t]his trope of inversion, premised on disembodiment as it is, illustrates
how the mapping of transgender bodies was at the heart of sexological
discourse from the beginning., 55 In other words, he suggests, "transgender
operated as the structuring principle for comprehending same (bio)logical
sex sexual desires. ' 56  Sexologists at the time used the term "sexual
inversion" to denote a broad range of deviant gender behavior of which
same-sex desire was only one aspect.5 v Sharpe suggests that there was
considerable hostility among some same-sex oriented men towards the
coupling of male homosexuality with effeminacy, and correspondingly, an
intentional disassociation by many gay men from both transgender
communities and those gay men unwilling or unable to conform to
normative gender roles and expression.58
The twentieth century evolution of sexual practices and prevalent
gender expressions among gay men in North American culture, examined
in light of the historical underpinnings illuminated by Professor Sharpe,
exemplifies the relational, interactive manner that produces both individual
and collective understandings of gender identity and expression. Historian
53. It should be noted that this discussion of Halberstam's work was offered for the
process it demonstrates and not for any normative assumption that there exists a stable or
non-constructivist meaning to the terms masculine and feminine. For a reference to the
difficulties associated with employing the terms masculine and feminine, see supra note 4.
54. ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE: DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW
17 (Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 22 n.4.
George Chauncey writes that it was not until the mid-twentieth century that
homosexual behavior per se became the basis for labeling and self-
identification by men as gay or queer.59 "[B]efore then, most men were so
labeled only if they displayed a much broader inversion of their ascribed
gender status by assuming the sexual and other cultural roles ascribed to
women."60 Chauncey, and others, have argued that gay men during this era
generally did not seek or desire sex with other gay men, but rather were
much more likely to pursue sexual interactions with "straight," and usually
stereotypically masculine men, in which the straight participant always
played an insertive and non-reciprocating role.61  Chauncey states that
"[m]any fairies and queers socialized into the dominant prewar homosexual
culture considered the ideal sexual partner to be 'trade,' a 'real man,' that
is, ideally a sailor, a soldier, or some other embodiment of the aggressive
masculine male ideal. 62 He suggests that, "[t]he centrality of effeminacy
to the definition of the fairy in the dominant culture enabled trade to have
sex with both the queers and fairies without risking being labeled queer
themselves, so long as they maintained a masculine demeanor and sexual
role. 63  A confluence of factors in the middle of the twentieth century
shifted public perceptions as to the defining features of "the homosexual,"
so that the division between gay and straight no longer turned upon gender
expression more broadly, but instead exclusively upon sexual behavior; any
party to same-sex relations, regardless of their role in the interaction, now
became labeled a homosexual.64 Straight men who had once felt no stigma
being "serviced" by queers and fairies began to withdraw from such sexual
practices, and "[t]his growing sexual iron curtain cut many homosexuals
off from their traditional objects of desire, and created a dilemma for those
who had grown used to such partners."
65
59. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE
MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 13 (Basic Books 1994).
60. Id. See also EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 2
(University of California Press 1990), where she notes that, despite its present day ubiquity,
the categorization of people based on sexual choice is a relatively new cultural phenomenon
within Western societies.
61. CHAUNCEY, supra note 59, at 21. See also ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER
FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two 42 (Free Press 1990).
62. CHAUNCEY, supra note 59, at 16.
63. Id.
64. This multitude of factors included: developments in psychiatry, which changed
perceptions about the meaning of deviance, Sharpe, supra note 54, at 17; the return of a vast
number of gay and lesbian veterans, whose exposure to one another during WWII had
spawned a realization that there were others like themselves, and a corresponding
emergence of group identity and new found pride, ROTELLO, infra note 65, at 51; the
McCarthy era "Red Scare," in which homosexuals were often cast as communists and vice-
versa, id. at 53; and the rising civil rights movement in the United States, id. at 54.
65. GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF GAY MEN 52
(Dutton 1997).
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In the aftermath of this shift, a more diverse spectrum of gender
expression emerged within gay male communities; gay men who identified
as butch, gay men whose gender expressions were very conventionally
masculine, and new, more versatile sexual practices in which gay men,
regardless of their gender expression, were much more likely to play both
insertive and receptive roles.6 6 As relations between heterosexuals and
homosexuals changed, so too did gender expressions (both of a non-sexual
and sexual nature) and social understandings about the gender implications
of homosexuality. While the emergence of the butch gay male and the re-
gendering of certain sexual practices, such as the receptive role in male-on-
male anal sex, must also be considered in light of a newly emerging gay
liberation movement in which gays and lesbians had begun to shed their
shackles of shame and create a community, it is unlikely that greater
visibility and public acceptance could alone account for this shift in the
sexual practices, gender expressions and self identities of mid 20th century
gay men.
Susan Faludi's conclusions following her investigation into why male
cadets at the Citadel were so enraged by the admission of women into the
military academy also demonstrates the manner in which meanings of
masculinity and femininity are relationally produced and contextually
dependent. Faludi concludes that the reason the Citadel did not want
females admitted was a fear that the presence of females would interfere
with the manner in which the male cadets interacted with each other. There
was a concern on the part of the cadets, and the institution itself, that if
females were admitted, the male cadets would be precluded from the
nurturing and care-giving behavior they typically provided one another,
thus depriving them of important bonding interactions.67 As one officer put
it, "[w]ith no women, we can hug each other. There's nothing so nurturing
as an infantry platoon., 68 What was considered suitable gender expression
for the group changed in the presence of what the men perceived to be
another differently gendered group. In other words, they interpreted the
same relational behavior, between the same members of the group as
masculine in one context and feminine in another.
66. ROTELLO, supra note 65, at 50-53. In many cultures, including pre-WWII North
American culture, insertive and receptive sexual roles have been imbued with meanings of
masculinity and femininity respectively. In many cultures in which all gay men are
understood to be effeminate, the participant playing the insertive role in sodomy between
two men is not considered homosexual, see, e.g. Don Kulick, The Gender of Brazilian
Transgendered Prostitutes, in THE MASCULINITY STUDIES READER 389, 389 (Rachel Adams
& David Savran eds., Blackwell Publishers 2002).
67. SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 126 (William
Morrow & Co. 1999).
68. Id. at 127.
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III. TRANS-PHOBIA AND ITS RELATION TO THE
RELATIONAL PRODUCTION OF GENDER
In Transgender Nation, Gordene MacKenzie analyzed over forty
American television talk shows and documentaries depicting transgender
individuals, airing from 1985 to 1992;69 she consistently observed a fearful
response in the majority of audience members. MacKenzie suggested that
the reaction of fear was often articulated by the audience members as an
attack on their own gender identity.7 ° She observed that "the majority of
televised audience members . . . exhibited varying degrees of discomfort
and anxiety. Without exception, each program featured at least one
audience member or call-in viewer who responded as if their personal
identity were under severe attack.,
71
Numerous reasons related to gender inequality and its corresponding
inequitable material wealth and power distributions suggest why
hegemonic gender systems endeavor to police strict gender roles and
sustain a binary gender order. Such inequities provide one plausible
explanation for why trans-phobia exists both within certain social
infrastructure and among particular demographics, such as some
heterosexual men. However, such explanations do not necessarily account
for the intolerance towards gender transgression found within gay and
lesbian communities, feminist communities, and transgender
72
communities. The intolerance towards gender transgression demonstrated
by gays, lesbians, feminists, and even transgender individuals themselves
suggests that trans-phobia is not simply the product of a hierarchical gender
order reliant for its proper functioning upon the ability to maintain a strict
gender binary in which the feminine is subjugated to the masculine. But
then what does cause this widespread intolerance towards gender
transgression? Why is it that for many people, "few things are more
uncomfortable than seeing someone whose gender you can't discern?" 73 In
my view it is not the transgression itself that generates this intolerance, but
rather the disruption experienced as a consequence of the uncertainty that
transgression can cause.
69. GORDENE MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 109 (Bowling Green State
University Popular Press 1994).
70. Id. at 109-10.
71. Id. at 110.
72. For a discussion of this intolerance, see PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE
POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM (Cleis Press 2003) (1997); see also Riki Wilchins,
Deconstructing Trans, in GENDER QUEER: VOICES FROM BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 55
(Joan Nestle, et al. eds., Alyson Books 2002) [hereinafter DECONSTRUCTING].
73. Wilchins, DECONSTRUCTING, supra note 72, at 56.
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A. DISRUPTING IDENTITY
In identifying what he describes as bisexual erasure by both
heterosexuals and gays and lesbians, Kenji Yoshino offers, as one
motivating factor for this phenomenon, a shared investment in stabilizing
group identities by eradicating the threat to these identities posed by
bisexuality.7 4 "In a world that denies bisexual existence, cross-sex desire
and same-sex desire are mutually exclusive. This means that the presence
of cross-sex desire ipso facto negates the presence of same-sex desire and
vice versa., 75 He argues that the existence of bisexuality, however, calls
into question the sexual orientation of the self. It does so, he suggests, by
disrupting the bifurcated identification strategies deployed by gays and
straights to understand their sexualities; bisexuality disrupts their identity
categories, thus depriving them of the comfort members of all groups take
"in knowing their place in the social order."
76
Professor Yoshino's analysis can also be applied in the context of
gender. Halberstam suggests that "[t]ransgender may indeed be considered
a term of relationality; it describes not simply an identity but a relation
between people, within a community, or within intimate bonds."7 7 She
notes that transgender is an important term not just for those "who want to
reside outside of categories altogether but to people who want to place
themselves in the way of particular forms of recognition."7 8 Not unlike the
perceived threat to sexual identity posed by the bisexual, the existence of
transgenderism challenges dyadic and biological, genitally determined
understandings of gender. In a world in which each of us is supposed to be
either a man or woman, identifying to which of "the two gender categories"
another individual belongs, affirms one's understanding of which category
one's own gender may be located. Under a binary understanding of
gender, and because gender is produced relationally, the very fact that one
cannot easily or instantly determine whether another individual is "the
same" as them or "the opposite" of them disrupts affirmation of one's own
gender categorization.
B. DISRUPTIONS TO THE EPISTEME OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
The disruption caused by this uncertainty in identity is then
compounded by the gendered nature of a great number of the social scripts
that govern our interpersonal interactions. Knowing one's socially agreed
upon role in any given interaction is comfortable. With respect to those
elements of identity, such as gender, which are produced through relational
74. Yoshino, supra note 5, at 362.
75. Id. at 401.
76. Id.
77. HALBERSTAM, QUEER TIME, supra note 13, at 49.
78. Id.
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interpretive processes, a clear sense of one's role or social script, and also
the scripts of those with whom one is interacting, allows one to affirm self-
identity with less cognitive effort than is required in situations of
uncertainty.
Halberstam's discussion of the "wrong bathroom phenomenon,, 79 as
she describes it, exemplifies the negative or intolerant reactions frequently
provoked by the uncertainty that gender transgression creates or perhaps
illuminates. Her bathroom account is a story familiar to any girl who grew
up as a tomboy, or any woman who presents herself as being somewhat
butch; being questioned and/or accused of being in the wrong bathroom.
Halberstam, who identifies as a masculine woman, recounts one plane trip
she took where she encountered the "aren't you in the wrong bathroom?"
challenge both on the way to her destination and on the way back!
Halberstam suggests that usually it is not that those women challenging the
presence of another in the bathroom actually believe that the individual is
male, but rather are disconcerted by the presence, in their washroom, of a
masculine female. 80 Why are they more disconcerted about the presence of
a "masculine female" in an airport bathroom than say a school or restaurant
restroom? Halberstam discusses airport bathrooms in particular because of
what she describes as the intensified gender policing by "in transit" people,
in response to the disruption they experience as a consequence of their
uncertain circumstances. She draws the following conclusion:
Needless to say, the policing of gender within the bathroom is
intensified in the space of the airport, where people are literally
moving through space and time in ways that cause them to want to
stabilize some boundaries (gender) even as they traverse others
(national).8'
The socio-legal efforts deployed to stabilize gender categories in
response to perceived gender transgression demonstrate how it is often the
uncertainty created by these transgressions at which these stabilization
tactics are directed. Legal and social skirmishes over whose privilege it is
to define what is a real woman, or to define gender in general, illustrate a
desire to reduce this uncertainty through gate-keeping measures that
attempt to stabilize gender categories.
79. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 365.
80. Id. at 368.
81. Id. at 366.
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C. SOCIAL EFFORTS TO STABILIZE A BINARY GENDER ORDER: THE
POWER OF NAMING
Imagine, then, the turmoil created in this "womanspace" when
one day a tall, quiet woman who had shown up regularly at
meetings for several weeks suddenly came out to the group as a
transsexual female. Not only that, she was a transsexual female
who identified as a lesbian. Suddenly "Micki," who had simply
appeared as an unusually tall, rather quiet and professionally
dressed woman, looked very different to the group's members ....
In the following weeks.., a few women, both lesbian and not,
reacted strongly, sharing that they felt threatened by Micki's
continued presence. Micki's feminine appearance bore witness to
the wonders of modem medicine, but to some she was nothing but
a fake ....
Her chosen identity as a lesbian posed another gender and
sexuality enigma. Having castrated "his" penis while leaving "his"
sexual orientation unscathed, to what label was s/he entitled? The
choice of a lesbian identity to express her (his) new identity as a
"woman-loving-woman" communicated an unfamiliar sex and
gender ambiguity. For some, the ambiguity only generated
hostility and feelings of mockery for this once-man's appropriation
of a label - lesbian - which they felt belonged only to "real
women.,,82
In her examination of female masculinity Halberstam discusses the
Lacanian concept of "urinary segregation. ' ' 3 She notes that Lacan used the
term to describe "the relations between identities and signifiers, and he
ultimately used the simple diagram of the rest-room signs 'Ladies' and
'Gentlemen' to show that within the production of sexual difference,
primacy is granted to the signifier over that which signifies. ,84 In other
words, naming confers, rather than reflects meaning.8 5 And so, the system
of urinary segregation creates rather than reflects the categories "men" and
"women." "Although rest-room signs seem to serve and ratify distinctions
that already exist, in actual fact these markers produce identifications
82. Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics of Identity: Who Owns the Label
"Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1997) (describing her experience as a member
of a women's support group).
83. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 369, citing Jacques Lacan,
The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in ECRITS: A SELECTION 151 (Alan Sheridan,
trans., Norton 1977).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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within these constructed categories., 86 Under Lacan's theory then, the act
of naming what is a real woman is itself constitutive of this social
category.87 Thus, exerting an authority to stipulate or "name" what does
and does not constitute a real woman or a real man carries with it
significant implications. To borrow from William I. Thomas' famous
sociological theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences.88 Those who wield the power to name possess the ability
to include or exclude others and in doing so, the ability to create categories
and to define themselves. This is demonstrated in the case of Nixon v.
Vancouver Rape Relief.89 Vancouver Rape Relief Society is a nonprofit
women's organization dedicated to assisting women in crisis due to male
violence. The organization describes itself as a feminist, anti-racist, pro-
choice, and pro-lesbian organization dedicated to the principle, among
others, that all members must work towards eliminating their existing
prejudices. 90 Kimberly Nixon, a post-operative transsexual woman who
was herself a victim of male sexual violence, responded to an
advertisement by the Vancouver Rape Relief Society for volunteers who
wished to train as peer counselors.91 Although they initially accepted her
into the volunteer training program, this feminist, anti-racist, pro-lesbian
organization whose members espouse a dedication to work on an on-going
basis on their existing prejudices, forced her to leave the program upon
discovering that Ms. Nixon was a transsexual woman. 92 Ms. Nixon filed a
complaint under the British Columbia Human Rights Code.93  The
Vancouver Rape Relief Society argued that it was entitled to determine
who was "woman enough" to meet the organization's purposes.94 They
maintained that unless they could decide who a woman was for their
purposes, their integrity as an organization devoted to promoting the
interests and welfare of women would be so compromised as to render the
organization meaningless.95 While Ms. Nixon was successful before the
96 udcareHuman Rights Tribunal, upon judicial review, the British Columbia
86. Halberstam, Female Masculinity, supra note 34, at 369
87. Id.
88. WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN AMERICA:
BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 572 (Alfred A. Knopf 1928).
89. Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, [2003] 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 254, appeal
dismissed by British Columbia Court of Appeal, see Vancouver Rape Relief Society v.
Nixon, [2005] BCJ No. 2647 601 CA (leave to appeal denied, [2006] SCCA No. 365).
90. Nixon, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th), 8, at 260.
91. Id. 6, 8, at 260.
92. Id. T 9, at 260.
93. Id. T 9, at 260.
94. Id. T 28, at 263.
95. Id. For the purposes of their "women only" policy, the Vancouver Rape Relief
Society wanted to define "woman" as including only those individuals who had been raised
and lived their lives exclusively as women. Id. 29, at 263.
96. Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, [2002] BCHRT 1 (B.C. Human Rights
Trib.)
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Supreme Court, despite its finding that Kimberly Nixon was "legally and
medically" a woman, agreed with the Vancouver Rape Relief Society: The
Court held that the Tribunal had erred in failing to conclude that the
Vancouver Rape Relief Society had the right under the Code to exclude
from its Peer Counseling Program individuals who had not lived their
entire lives as women.9 7 An appeal of this decision to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal was denied.
This effort to exert control over the process of naming what is a
"woman" can be found in Janice Raymond's 1979 book The Transsexual
Empire.98 One of Raymond's foundational premises, in what can only be
described as an exceptionally hostile and trans-phobic piece of work,
highlights the importance often attached to the process of naming. 99
Raymond alleges that transsexualism is a medical invention formulated by
a patriarchal medical community in an effort to create for themselves, the
ability to determine who and what constitutes a real woman. Raymond
argues that:
In the medical theodicy, transsexuals surrender themselves to the
transsexual therapists and technicians. The medical order then tells
transsexuals what is healthy and unhealthy (the theological
equivalents of good and evil). Thus the classification function of
the term transsexualism analyzes a whole system of meaning that
is endowed with an extraordinary power of structuring reality.' 00
While in large measure, Raymond's characterization of the medical
community's response to and treatment of transfolks may be apt, the
preceding passage also underscores the significance Raymond attaches to
the process of naming and the power of the signifier.' 0'
97. Nixon, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th), 119, at 276-77.
98. JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-
MALE (Beacon Press 1979) (I reference Raymond's 1979 book because it was heavily relied
upon by segments of the second wave feminist movement to support anti-trans sentiment
and scholarship).
99. Id. at 104 ("[aill transsexuals rape women's bodies by reducing the female form
to an artifact, appropriating this body for themselves.").
100. Id. at 2. Raymond superficially addresses the obvious challenge to her claim -
the existence of FTM transsexual people - by offhandedly suggesting that trans men are
tokens intended to artificially validate transsexualism as a human reality. RAYMOND, supra
note 98, at 26-27.
101. Raymond's assertion that transsexualism is a medical invention of the 20th
century, id. at xv, is ill conceived. A wealth of anthropological and historical literature
establishes that transsexualism, of some variety, has existed and continues to exist across a
broad span of time periods and cultures. See FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 22-29. See also
JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A.
281-84 (Meridian revised ed. 1992) (1976) (discussing the Two-Spirited people, referred to
as "berdaches," observed in many Native American tribal Societies). See also CALIFIA,
supra note 72, at 120-42 (discussing various transgender communities in Native American
tribal societies, India, and Myanmar). Notably, Califia also suggests that gay and lesbian
historians, such as Katz, have glossed over transgender identities by co-opting them into a
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D. A WOMAN NAMED BILL?
"'But it's all wrong, you know,' declared Dorothy, earnestly; 'and, if
you don't mind, I shall call you 'Billina.' Putting the 'eena' on the end
makes it a girl's name, you see."",102 Said Dorothy upon first encountering
Bill, a talking yellow chicken. "In her Oz adventures, Dorothy encountered
cyclones and earthquakes, witches and wizards, and all manner of
miraculous happenings. She accepted the incredible with great aplomb.
But one occurrence she simply could not accept: a woman named Bill.
Even if that 'woman' happened to be a 'talking chicken."
' 0 3
The gender policing often exercised through the process of naming is
repeatedly found in case law addressing transsexual individuals seeking
legal name changes that better reflect their gender identities and/or
expressions. In The Matter of Anonymous for Leave to Change His Name,
an American court denied a pre-operative MTF woman's application for a
change of name on the basis that "the change of name from a 'male' name
to a 'female' name would be fraught with danger of deception and
confusion and contrary to the public interest." 1°4 The case illuminates an
effort on the part of the legal officials who originally denied the petitioner's
application, as well as the court itself, to maintain the authority to
determine not only who shall have "boys' names" and who shall have
"girl's names," but also, implicitly, the ability to decide what are "boys'
names" and what are "girl's names. ' 105 The court's reference to the
deception and confusion that they suggest could arise were they to grant
this woman's request is puzzling. The petitioner in this case identified and
presented as a woman. Her application stemmed from a desire "to avoid
embarrassing situations" by changing her name to one which more
accurately reflected her self-identity and expression. 0 6 How could a name
that "matches" this petitioner's gender expression be more confusing to
people than one which does not?'
07
gay/lesbian paradigm for understanding these individuals' experiences. Id. at 123-26.
102. L. FRANK BAUM, OZMA OF Oz 31 (William Morrow & Co. 1989) (1907).
103. Baby Name Wizard Blog - Discussing Trends in Baby Names, The Sound of
Androgyny, http://thebabynamewizard.ivillage.com/parenting/archives/2005/11 /index.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (commenting on L. Frank Baum's famous character, see id).
104. In the Matter of the Application of Anonymous for Leave to Change His Name,
587 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992).
105. By overlooking the fact that names are a matter of social tradition, not a legal
creation, and that some names are traditionally associated with either gender, it seems clear
that the court's exercise of authority was deployed in an effort to maintain gender norms.
106. Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
107. This point is made for descriptive purposes in recognition, but not endorsing,
the culturally constructed attachment of particular names with a particular gender. Kate
Bornstein relates an amusing anecdote about the Montana Educational Telecommunications
Network, a computer bulletin board that enabled students in tiny rural schools to
communicate with other students from all around the world. One teacher reported: "When
we got our first messages from Japan, a wonderful little fifth-grade girl named Michelle was
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In In the Matter of Frank Joseph Guido the court denied a pre-
operative transsexual woman's application to change her name to Cynthia
Alexandria Frank, without prejudice to renew her application upon
completion of sex reassignment surgery and a divorce from her wife.
10 8
The court supported its denial on the basis that:
Under the present state of the law, same-sex marriages are not
recognized. It would therefore be inconsistent for this court to
grant the relief requested, to permit the applicant to appear and
represent himself as female, while in fact he remains in a legal
relationship with his wife premised on his being male.'0 9
That the court considered refusing the name change to be a measure
that would prevent the petitioner from "represent[ing] himself as female" is
illustrative of just how much stock this particular court placed in the
importance of a name)1° One wonders what the court would have done if
Cynthia's parents had named her Dale, or Pat rather than Frank.
E. ADJUDICATING IDENTITY CLAIMS: LEGAL ATTEMPTS TO STABILIZE
GENDER
Courts often endeavor to stabilize and make certain categories of
gender through legal analysis developed to determine a litigant's sex in the
context of a particular legal claim. By conceptualizing gender as
biologically determined by one's sex and then ignoring or denying the
transitive reality of sex for many transsexual litigants, the law is able to
maintain a static understanding of gender thus reducing uncertainty; if
gender is understood as static, it appears as more certain.
In examining the judicial response to transsexualism, Professor Keller
suggests that courts typically conceptualize transsexualism in one of two
ways."' In those cases where the court is willing to accept the claim of a
transsexual litigant, the court usually adopts a model of identity that seeks
asked if she was a boy or a girl. She was extraordinarily indignant at that, and said, 'I'm
Michelle - I'm a girl of course.' Then I pointed out the Japanese name of the person who
had asked the question and said 'Do you know if this is a boy or girl?' She said, 'No, how
am I supposed to know that?' BORNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 23.
108. In the Matter of Frank Joseph Guido, Jr., for Leave to Assume the Name of
Cynthia Alexandria Frank, 771 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Civ.Ct. 2003).
109. Id. at 790 (citing a decision/order of the court, dated September 25, 2002,
denying the application for a name change). The court's reasoning in this case is also
indicative of heterosexist or homophobic attitudes. For a discussion of the intersection
between same-sex marriage and transgender jurisprudence, see SHARPE, supra note 54, at
17. See also Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REv. 1031 (2001).
110. The court granted her renewed application, but not before Ms. Frank had
undertaken the humiliating process of providing the court with a notarized "Consent" from
her wife and a letter from her physician confirming that Ms. Frank was being treated for
Gender Identity Disorder. Guido, 771 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
111. Keller, supra note 35, at 334.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:2
to erase the transsexual's past. Conversely, in those cases where the court
views the transsexual litigant's claim as untenable, the court frequently
denies the transsexual's identity claim altogether. 12  She notes, for
instance, that in Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n 1 3 the court, in
endorsing the post-operative MTF litigant's gender claim, "cites
approvingly the testimony of Richards' expert witness that ... Richards'
internal anatomy was 'that of a female who has been hysterectomized and
ovariectomized,' even though Richards never in fact had a uterus or ovaries
to be removed. ' 4 The court, Keller suggests, accepts Richards' gender
claim by rewriting her anatomical history and thus erasing both her
transsexual past and the transition itself."5  Keller also highlights, in
contrast, the court's reasoning in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines." 6 In Ulane the
court denied an MTF transsexual woman's claim of employment
discrimination, arguing that Ulane was "a biological male who takes female
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to
make it appear female. ' 17 In either line of reasoning, whether the Court
finds for the transsexual litigant or not, it has adopted an understanding of
gender as fixed, immutable and biologically determined. While perhaps it
is unsurprising that in those cases where the transsexual litigant's claim is
denied the Court has refused to give legal recognition to the individual's
transition, it is remarkable that even where the Court does recognize the
transsexual litigant's identity claim and correspondingly their preferred
gender, it does so in a manner that discursively leaves intact the notion of
gender as static, binary, and biologically determined.
Another tactic employed by courts to secure a jurisprudential
understanding of gender as fixed and immutable is to invoke natural law or
religious rhetoric. This tactic was demonstrated by the Texas Court of
Appeals decision in Littleton v. Prange.1 8 In Littleton, a post-operative
transsexual woman was denied standing to file a medical malpractice suit,
subsequent to the death of her husband, on the grounds that she could not
legally be the surviving spouse of another man.' 19 The court ruled that God
112. Keller, supra note 35, at 334.
113. In Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977), the claimant, a
post-operative transsexual woman, filed a claim against the U.S. Tennis Association for
excluding her eligibility to participate in the professional woman's tennis circuit due to a
chromosomal test indicating that Richards possessed XY chromosomes.
114. Keller, supra note 35, at 334.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
118. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex.App. 1999). For an in-depth
discussion of this case, see Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a
Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 745 (2000).
119. Ironically, gay and lesbian activists have added the Littleton decision to their
arsenal in the fight for same-sex marriage. Christie Littleton and her deceased husband
were legally married by Kentucky officials in 1989. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. Subsequent
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created Christie Littleton as a man and that neither the law nor the medical
community could change her into a woman. 120 The court held that sex, and
correspondingly gender in their view, was "immutably fixed by our Creator
at birth."'
' 21
One of the more literal examples of the law's attempt to help avoid the
cognitive dissonance that arises from gender ambiguity is the pre-Stonewall
era sumptuary laws requiring that every individual must wear at least three
pieces of clothing appropriate to his or her gender. In Vested Interests
Garber recounts the tale of lesbian critic Joan Nestle's experience with the
three piece law:
When the lesbian activist and critic Joan Nestle was living in New
York in the fifties, she was careful, when preparing for a night out,
to heed the warning of older lesbians: "Always wear three pieces of
women's clothing," they counseled, "so the vice squad can't bust
you for transvestism."
'1 22
Although at first glance such a law seems almost comedic in its inanity
(let alone its ability to be subverted or circumvented), in the 1950s and
1960s these laws were frequently used by police in gay bar raids to
persecute those who seemed the "queerest."'' 23 The perceived threat posed
by gender uncertainty is readily apparent in the wording employed by many
of these sumptuary laws. For example, the statute used to enforce gender
conformity in the state of New York, by prohibiting impersonation of a
female, defined a vagrant as one who has "his face painted, discolored,
covered or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated
to prevent his being identified."'' 24 Convictions under this law required
neither a showing that the "disguise" was donned in an effort to commit
some further crime, nor any proof that the "vagrant" individual was without
visible means of support. 125 Chicago's city ordinance imposed a fine on
"any person who shall appear in a public place ... in a dress not belonging
to his or her sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex (emphasis added)."' 126
to the Texas Court of Appeals decision ruling that Littleton was, for the purposes of
marriage, a man, those in favor of same sex marriage heralded the case as the first instance
of same sex marriage in the United States. See Frye & Meiselman, supra note 109, for an
in-depth discussion of this case.
120. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
121. Id. at 224.
122. GARBER, supra note 7, at 140-4 1.
123. See Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and Lezzies: The
Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
33, 62 (1995); see also FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 8. Shockingly, in some cities these laws
were still being enforced well into the 1980s. See D.C. & M.S. v. City of St. Louis, 795
F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986).
124. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 887(7) (Consol. 1958).
125. People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. App. Term 1968), affid, 27
N.Y.2d (N.Y. 1970).
126. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 192-8 (1965) (amended 1980).
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In countries such as the United States, Canada, and Britain, courts and
legislatures are beginning to recognize the identity claims of some
members of the transgender community in certain legal contexts. Although
courts have tended to be less progressive in the family law context (likely
for reasons relating to systemic homophobia), 27 with respect to issues such
as identification documents, the provision of public health care, and
employment discrimination, both courts and legislatures are slowly
becoming somewhat more sympathetic to the identity claims of transsexual
litigants. Transsexual individuals comprise only part of a much larger
transgender community, however, and unfortunately the small legal
victories and partial legal recognition achieved by transsexual litigants has
not been attained by the broader trans community.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING TRANS-PHOBIA
A. RECONCEPTUALIZING GENDER
If the relational interpretive processes through which gender identity is
in part produced perpetuates the trans-phobia prevalent within our society,
what can be done to combat this phenomenon? Gender identities and
social understandings about gender will always be developed in part
through relational processes. Many aspects of our identities are created in a
relational manner. However, it is not the relational development of
gendered meanings that perpetuates trans-phobia. The difficulty stems
from the false construct of gender that our relational efforts have been
socially programmed to try to maintain. Current conceptions of gender
demand our relational processes affirm a certain and binary gender order
that is not always reflective of reality and, as a result, gender transgressions
of all sorts are often experienced as being disruptive. If the binary, static
understanding of gender is problematic, then how should we conceptualize
gender?
There is significant disagreement among theorists as to a more
appropriate, or perhaps less problematic, manner of conceptualizing
gender.1 28 However, progress towards the reduction of trans-phobia does
127. SHARPE, supra note 54, at 60.
128. In examining typical responses to transvestism, Marjorie Garber discusses both
the manner in which the possibility of a "third," as she describes it, challenges binary
thinking, thus introducing a crisis, and the tendency to erase the "third" by assimilating it
into "either the male or female pole of the hypothetical gender binarism .. " GARBER,
supra note 7, at 10. Garber describes this notion of the "third" in the following manner:
"the 'third term' is not a term. Much less is it a sex .... [tihe 'third' is a mode of
articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility. Three puts in question the idea of
one: of identity, self-sufficiency, self-knowledge." Id. at 11. Patrick Califia argues that a
demarcating line between genders does exist, but that the boundary is unclear; Califia
proposes that one's relationship to one's physical body ultimately determines the particular
point on a bipolar gender continuum at which one is located. See Pat Califia, Who Is My
Sister? Powersurge and the Limits of Our Community, VENUS INFERS, Summer 1993, at 4.
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not necessitate the whole-hearted adoption of any one reconceptualization
of gender; it is actually the process of re-conceptualizing itself that will do
the subversive work needed. It is not necessary, or even desirable, that we
settle upon some new dogma that instructs us upon how to understand
gender. A more plausible approach involves a gradual evolution in
understandings of gender identity. An understanding that, whatever gender
is, it is not a dimorphic and static reality, would alleviate the cognitive
dissonance experienced when one encounters gender expressions that
cannot be reconciled with a binary understanding of gender (and
consequently are disruptive to one's efforts to maintain the illusion of this
static binary through the relational construction of one's own gender
identity). Gender identity would continue to be produced, in part,
relationally, 12 9 but gender ambiguity, illusory gender identities and gender
transgressions would no longer pose such a threat to our self-
understandings because we would not be troubled with striving to fit our
perceptions into these very narrowly construed and restrictive categories.
Support for this proposition may be found in the tolerance for gender
Califia's argument is discussed in Nan Alamilla Boyd's piece Bodies in Motion: Lesbian
and Transsexual Histories. Nan Alamilla Boyd, Bodies in Motion: Lesbian and
Transsexual Histories, in A QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 134, 143-45 (Martin Duberman ed., New York University Press 1997). In Female
Masculinity Judith Halberstam advocates for the conceptualization of gender as a system of
"gender preference" as opposed to compulsory gender binarism. Halberstam, supra note
34, at 370-71. She suggests that "[a] system of gender preference would allow for gender
neutrality until such a time when the child or young adult announces his or her or its
gender." Id. Halberstam's proposal is developed in response to Marjorie Garber's
suggestion that transvestites and transsexuals demonstrate the fallacy of a binary system of
gender by introducing the possibility of a "third space" that consequently destabilizes the
binaries. GARBER, supra note 7, at 11; see also Halberstam, supra note 34, at 369.
Halberstam questions the subversive potential of conceptualizing a "third space;" she argues
that "[u]nfortunately, as in all attempts to break a binary by producing a third term, Garber's
third space tends to stabilize the other two." Id. She further critiques the notion of a "third
space" by suggesting that "thirdness" tends to homogenize many different gender variations
under the banner of "other." Id. at 370-71. A counter-argument to Halberstam's critique of
the subversive potential of incorporating the possibility of a "third" into concepts of gender,
is found in Gilbert Herdt's suggestion as to what the "third" represents. Gilbert Herdt, Third
Genders, Third Sexes, in A QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 100 (Martin Duberman ed., New York University Press 1997). He suggests "[t]he
presence of only two categories, a dyad, creates an inherent relationship of duality of spirit
and flesh, an inevitable oppositionality, an instability. When, however, a third category or
class is introduced, a new dynamic develops between the dyadic agents." Id. at 105.
Quoting German sociogolist George Simmel, he argues "[t]he dyad represents both the first
synthesis and unification, and the first separation and antithesis. The appearance of the third
party indicates transition, conciliation, and the abandonment of absolute contrast." Id.
Herdt's reference to the impact of introducing a "third" on the dynamic between dyadic
agents is of particular interest when contemplating the suggestion that gender is produced, in
part, through relational processes.
129. It may be, however, that our binary understanding of gender causes relational
processes to play a larger role in the production of gender identity than might be the case if
gender was understood in a more fluid sense. Inherent within the concept of the binary is a
relational method of interpreting others.
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diversity found in some other cultures that do reject binary systems by
formally recognizing more than two sexes and/or genders. 30
One such example is that of the Two-Spirited individuals found within
the traditional societies of numerous Native American nations. Several
academics have documented the honored status enjoyed by Two-Spirited
individuals in many Native American societies. 131  In Transgender
Warriors, Feinberg recounts a discussion she had with a Two-Spirited poet
and writer named Chrystos. In discussing her community's understanding
of gender, Chrystos commented:
The whole concept of gender is more fluid in traditional life.
Those paths are not necessarily aligned with your sex, although
they may be .... In traditional life a Two-Spirit person can be
heterosexual or what we would call homosexual .... The gender
fluidity is part of a larger concept, which I guess the most accurate
English word for is 'tolerance.' It is a whole different way of
conceiving how to be in the world with other people. We think
about the world in terms of relationship, so each person is always
in a matrix, rather than being seen only as an individual - which
is a very different way of looking at things.
132
Scholars have also documented cultures in Papua, New Guinea that
accept intersex individuals who, at birth, have female genitalia but at
puberty experience a deepening of the voice and the descent of testes, as a
third sex. 133 Among the Sambia people of New Guinea, these individuals
are known as kwolu-aatmwol, which means "a person of transformation."'
' 34
"For Sambia, the kwolu-aatmwol begins at birth with the sex assignment of
the infant into a third category, and fans out in development to embrace
origin myths and social practices."'
' 35
These examples of cultures which recognize a third gender, or a third
sex, are offered not to suggest that an understanding of gender as a system
of three would be the preferred conceptualization in our culture, but rather
as examples of the tolerance for gender diversity that arise within cultures
that do not restrict themselves to strict binary models when thinking about
130. Herdt, supra note 128, at 105.
131. See KATZ, supra note 101, at 281; see also CALIFIA, supra note 72, at 124
(where he notes that the Gay American Indian History Project has identified over one
hundred and thirty Native American tribes that had berdache-like roles for men). Several of
these tribes also recognized gender variant roles for women. I note that Califia suggests that
Katz's characterization of these figures places too much emphasis on their same-sex
eroticism and not enough on the cross-gender identities these individuals maintained. Id. at
123. The controversy over co-opting historical trans figures by gay historians is referenced
in SHARPE, supra note 54, at 19.
132. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 27.
133. See, e.g. Herdt, supra note 128, at 101.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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gender. So how can the law be used to instigate a re-conceptualization of
gender in our society?
B. ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY GENDER DESIGNATIONS
Sex designation and distinction, and concomitantly gender designation
and distinction, in our legal system are ubiquitous. The assumption that
sex/gender must be designated in every legal context, and most social ones,
reinforces the notion that gender is static and that it is comprised of only
two categories. It also presumes, erroneously, that gender can always be
ascertained. Both the process of re-evaluating the pervasive and
unchallenged designation of gender, by creating a discourse in which we
question the relevance of gender to a particular context, as well as the end
result of such a re-evaluation, would contribute to a de-emphasis and
corresponding re-conceptualization of gender. While there are contexts
that may legitimately require sex and/or gender distinction, there are others
in which it is unnecessary. The designations of both sex and gender should
be critically challenged and in those contexts where their utility is
questionable, such designations should be eliminated. This type of reform
could be pursued through both legislative and legal processes.
Elizabeth Reilly offers one example of a legal sex distinction that is
unnecessary. In Reilly's recent proposal, regarding the legal response to
intersexuality, she suggests that the law's "wholesale acceptance of the
deeply rooted assumption that sex identity is simple and binary.., has
unnecessarily made the legal system an active enforcer of differentiation
that operates inexorably to exclude intersexuals from basic protections of
the law."' 136 Reilly argues that one insignificant change in current systems
of legal record keeping, that of designating sex identification at birth on
health data collection forms rather than on birth certificates, could remove
a legal stumbling block that profoundly impacts intersex individuals.
Concomitantly, such a shift would impact current understandings of sex
and gender by disaggregating the concept of "'identification,' an external
process,.., with 'identity,' a subjective and internal process not
susceptible to external assignment."' 137  Reilly suggests that legal sex
designation be delayed until such time as the child has "a more mature age,
when the identity will show and define itself.' ' 138 Reilly argues that by the
time "sex identity" begins to matter for legal identification purposes, the
vast majority of children will have a reasonably clear sense of their
identity;' 39 she suggests that delaying the designation of sex on the child's
136. Elizabeth Reilly, Radical Tweak - Relocating the Power to Assign Sex: from
Enforcer of Differentiation to Facilitator of Inclusiveness: Revising the Legal Response to
Intersexuality, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 297, 299-300 (2005).
137. Id. at 312.
138. Reilly, supra note 136, at 316.
139. Id. For the vast majority, gender identity will correspond with anatomical sex,
but as Reilly reports, a significant minority of children are born with intersex conditions. Id.
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legal documents would allow the child's own preferences to prevail. 40 It
would also permit many transfolks, who report having had an awareness of
their transgenderism from the point of childhood or early adolescence,' 4'
the possibility of avoiding many of the legal battles and denial of basic
rights currently faced by members of the transgender community who are
unable to obtain legal identification documents. Reilly notes that in most
contexts, including some legal ones, we are already relied upon to self-
identify our sex and gender. 142  She also notes that in the context of
adoption, birth certificates are often amended to "remove one set of
indisputable biological facts in order to replace them with another set of
social facts deemed to be of greater significance to the individual for
identity purposes. These changes are not required for legal purposes, as
other documents ... establish the legal reality."' 143 A similar practice of
amending legal documents to reflect social facts, rather than biological
ones, occurs in some Canadian provinces, where the birth certificates of
children born to lesbian and gay couples can now indicate, as the parents,
the names of the biological mother and co-parent or biological father and
co-parent.1
44
Although Reilly's focus is on intersex individuals and her proposal
focuses on sex assignment rather than gender assignment, what she
suggests essentially is that sex identification for legal purposes be delayed
until such time as the child has come to some self-understanding of their
gender identity. In other words, sex identification should follow gender
identification rather than the other way around. As Reilly and others have
noted, precedent for such a process of self-identification already exists in
the context of racial identification. 145 Race, which as critical race theorists
at 299.
140. Reilly, supra note 136, at 316.
141. JASON CROMWELL, TRANSMEN AND FTMs: IDENTITIES, BODIES, GENDERS, AND
SEXUALITIES 2 (University of Illinois Press 1999).
142. Reilly, supra note 136, at 315.
143. Id. at 299 n.5.
144. In British Columbia two lesbian couples, each of whom had babies with assisted
insemination, successfully brought a human rights complaint arguing that the Vital Statistics
Registrar had discriminated against them on the ground of sexual orientation by refusing to
name both mothers on the birth certificate. Gill and Maher, Murray and Popoff v. Ministry
of Health, [2001 ] BCHRT 34. Upon judicial review the court determined that the Human
Rights Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to order a change to the Vital Statistics form.
Minister of Health Planning v. Human Rights Tribunal, [2003] BCSC 1112. However, the
Minister of Health has amended the form and it is now possible to record the names of both
mothers or both fathers on the birth certificates of children born to gay couples. See British
Columbia Ministry of Health Service, Registration of Live Birth, http://www.vs.gov.bc.cal
forms/vsa404c.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). Similar litigation is currently underway in
Ontario. See M.D.R. v. Ontario (Deputy Registrar General) [2006] O.J. No. 2268. See also
A.A. v. B.B., [2007] O.C.J. No. 2 (in which the Ontario Court of Appeal granted legal status
to three parents, a lesbian couple and the biological father).
145. Reilly, supra note 136, at 324-25; see also Greenberg, supra note 118, at 926,
939-40.
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have argued is in part a social construction, is not designated on birth
certificates because it is considered to be a critical aspect of self identity
and it is "not ethical for anyone to exert power to define a feature of
[another's] core identity."'146
The legal reform that Professor Reilly proposes is relatively simple,
straightforward and minimal. However, the impact on the lives of many
transgender individuals would be significant. In thirty-four American
states, transsexuals, even those who have undergone sex reassignment
surgery, are legally unable to change the sex designation on their birth
certificates, 147 which means they also cannot change their driver's licenses
or passports. 148 For these individuals, because their physical appearance
does not correspond with the sex indicated on their identification
documents, activities such as driving a car or crossing a national border
become difficult, if not impossible.
The reduction of unnecessary sex/gender designations or distinctions
could also be achieved through a shift in the litigation strategies typically
employed by those advocating on behalf of transsexual claimants. Justice
and equality for transfolks is often pursued through efforts to achieve legal
recognition of one's gender identity (i.e., recognition of one's "preferred"
gender); often recognition is pursued through attempts to receive legal
designation of the sex that normatively correlates with one's gender
identity. These efforts occur in many areas of law including family law
(i.e., recognition of marital unions and parental rights), employment law
(i.e., access to gendered workspaces such as office washrooms), and human
rights and equality law (i.e., the treatment of transgender inmates).
Although gains have been made through such efforts, the difficulties with
this approach to reform are: (i) it endows the courts with the privilege of,
and authority to, both define the categories of man and woman/male and
female and then serve as the gatekeepers of those categories; (ii) it is a
strategy that has often not been particularly successful in those cases where
the dispute involves an adjudication between the rights and interests of
transgender individuals and those of other groups such as "women;" and
(iii) it concedes, rather than challenges, the appropriateness of designating
gender in whatever context is at issue.
A review of transgender jurisprudence suggests that endowing the
courts with the power to create a formula to ascertain the sex and/or gender
of a transgender litigant, which is the predominate method employed by
146. Reilly, supra note 136, at 324.
147. Id. at 299 n.7 (citing Janine M. Demanda, Our Transgressions: The Legal
System's Struggle with Providing Equal Protection to Transgender and Transsexual People,
71 UMKC L. REv. 507, 522 (2002)).
148. That this is the case challenges the efficacy of indicating on legal documents
"M" or "F" for purposes of identification, since for these individuals such an indication may
actually be misleading. In New York, the driver's license of a post-operative transsexual
can be amended by leaving the sex designation blank. Id. at 313 n.64.
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courts today to adjudicate gender identity claims, does not serve the
interests of a great many members of the transgender community. Under
the most progressive formula used by American courts, an individual's
proclaimed gender identity will only be acknowledged if the court deems
the individual to have attained what they have described as psychological
and anatomical harmony. 49  In other words, while the court may
sometimes recognize the post-surgical reality of a litigant who has
undergone sex reassignment surgery, transgender litigants who are pre-
operative, or non-operative are unlikely to receive legal recognition from
the court. What is worse, in most American cases adjudicating transgender
claims, particularly in the family law context, the courts have ascribed to a
strictly biological approach to defining the categories of man and
woman. 5 °  Following the British precedent established in Corbett v.
Corbett,'51 the courts apply a tripartite test that designates sex, and for the
courts' purposes gender, based solely on the gonads, genitals, and/or
chromosomes of the litigant. Under this analysis, the identity claims of
even those transgender individuals who have undergone the very most to
normatively reconcile their physical being with their gender identity, those
being post-operative transsexuals will be denied.
152
Even in cases where the courts have ascribed to the more progressive
psychological and anatomical harmony formula rather than a purely
biological (gonadal, genital, chromosomal) test, the criteria the courts have
selected to ascertain whether psychological and anatomical harmony has
been achieved, has at times been trans-phobic, homophobic and/or sexist.
For instance, in the marriage context, the determining factor was often the
post-surgical capacity of MTF transwomen to be vaginally penetrated, thus
ensuring their ability to fulfill their marital obligations. 153 In M.T. v. J. T.,
the court held "for purposes of marriage under the circumstances of this
case, it is the [post-operative] sexual capacity of the individual which must
be scrutinized."'' 54 Sharpe suggests that some scholars continue to contend
that post-operative transsexuals should be granted legal recognition,
149. The origins of this "test" can be traced back to cases in which the courts
recognized the identity claims of the litigants because their anatomy had been brought into
conformity with their psychological sex via sex reassignment surgery. See, e.g. In the
Matter of Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968). See also M.T. v.J.T.,
355 A.2d 204, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1976).
150. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223. For a general discussion of American jurisprudence
on this point, see SHARPE, supra note 54, at 65.
151. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 106 (Prob., Divorce & Adm. Div.).
152. And thus we have the devastating result in cases such as Littleton, where, even
though at the time of marriage her gonads and genitals fit the court's definition for a
woman, they post facto nullified the marriage of a grieving post operative trans woman
because she had the wrong chromosomes. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d 223.
153. MT., 355 A.2d at 209. For a discussion of this jurisprudence, see SHARPE,
supra note 54, at 61-65.
154. SHARPE, supra note 54, at 61-65.
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provided they can fulfill the role of the sex in which they have been
assigned. 1
55
Due to the complexity, nuance, and in particular, individuality of both
sex and gender identity claims, not unlike racial and ethnic identity claims,
where it is possible, litigants should develop legal arguments that remove
from the courts the obligation and authority to define and gate keep the
categories of man and woman/male and female. One tactic for removing
from the courts this impossible task is to challenge the necessity and
legality of the sex/gender designation itself. For example, in Canada,
courts engaged in adjudicating the validity of a marital union will no longer
be faced with the difficult task of delving into the gonads, chromosomes, or
capacity for vaginal penetration of the litigants because it is no longer
necessary to have a vagina to get married in Canada. With the advent of
same-sex marriage, the need for sex/gender designations have been
removed from this particular legal context. 
156
Alternative attempts to have employers or governments accommodate
individual claimants' own definitions of gender and particular identity
claims, litigation strategies in some cases, particularly where the likelihood
is that identity claims would be resolved within a balancing of rights
analysis, should involve critically challenging the necessity or validity of
the gender based designation at issue.
In Goins v. West Group, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled that
Julienne Goins' employer did not violate the Minnesota Human Rights Act
by refusing Goins, a transsexual woman, access to the women's washroom
at work. 157 The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides protection against
discrimination for individuals "having or being perceived as having a self-
image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness."'' 58 There was no dispute among the parties that
Goins presented as, and conceived of herself as, a woman. Goins alleged
that the employer had engaged in impermissible discrimination by
designating the use of washrooms based on biological sex rather than based
on gender identity. Neither Goins, her employer, nor the court, challenged
the validity of enforcing a gender based designation for the use of
bathrooms. The dispute in this case, not unlike in Nixon and in many other
cases, 159 was over whose definition of gender should govern: Was Goins
woman enough to use the women's washroom? When a case follows this
course, courts tend towards a balancing of interests analysis - weighing
155. SHARPE, supra note 54, at 61.
156. Marriage for Civil Purposes Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33 (Can.).
157. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
158. Id. at 722.
159. See, e.g. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 722; see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984), Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1977).
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the interests of female born women with those of transwomen - and
unfortunately, under this analysis, the transsexual litigants tend to lose.
In Goins, the court accepted, without any critical analysis, the
assumption that "where financially feasible, the traditional and accepted
practice in the employment setting is to provide restroom facilities that
reflect the cultural preference for restroom designation based on biological
gender." 160 Imagine the reaction were this sort of "status quo reasoning"
unquestioningly utilized in the context of other types of discrimination or
equality claims. That said, in many jurisdictions this is the social climate in
which these cases are currently being adjudicated and this must be kept in
mind in order to develop effective litigation strategies.
Finally, this type of litigation concedes the validity of making these
gender designations in the first place and as a result the subversive impact
of this type of litigation does little, if any, work for those transpeople
whose gender identity either varies significantly over time or place or
simply does not fall neatly within one of the two categories currently used
to designate gender. In MT. v. J. T, the court, quoting the trial judge,
stated, "if the psychological choice of a person is medically sound, not a
mere whim, and irreversible sex reassignment surgery has been performed,
society has no right to prohibit the transsexual from leading a normal
life."' 61 Rather than promote a more fluid and nuanced conception of
gender, cases that result in reasoning such as this only serve to validate, if
not the reality then certainly the desirability, of a static and binary gender
order.
V. CONCLUSION
Gender transgression creates uncertainty because of both the relational,
interpretive processes through which gender identity is produced and the
gendered nature of many of the social scripts that instruct our interpersonal
interactions. This uncertainty is experienced as disruptive because it
conflicts with the predominate understanding of gender that our relational,
interpretive efforts have been socialized to maintain. While legal reforms
can do little to change the relational interpretive processes through which
we come to understand ourselves and others, they can gradually change the
way we think about gender. How could this be achieved? Through
incremental legal reforms, such as the one suggested by Professor Reilly, to
deemphasize gender distinction in contexts where it is not necessary.
There are spaces within our society where gender distinction serves
little utility yet has been sustained regardless; breaking down gender as a
signifying system in these arenas could instigate the proliferation of
alternative understandings of gender in other locations. Discourse has
160. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
161. M.T, 355 A.2d at 207 (emphasis added).
already commenced in which the relevance of gender designation to a
particular legal context is critically considered and reconceptualized. Such
a reconceptualization would serve two functions. First, an overall de-
emphasis of gender as such a predominate social signifier would require us
to rewrite many of our social scripts. If we no longer subconsciously relied
on gender to determine who opens the door for whom, who breaks eye
contact with whom first, and how firm a particular handshake should be,
but rather, developed a social episteme that did not rely on ascertaining the
gender of those with whom we interact, then we would not feel as uncertain
about how to act when confronted with gender ambiguity and/or
transgression.
Secondly, an acknowledgement that gender is dynamic and relational
in nature would lead to an understanding that whatever gender is, it is not
always a static, biologically determined binary. Under such an
understanding of gender, the relational processes through which we come
to understand ourselves would no longer be burdened with the task of
affirming the mythical gender binary; this would serve to reduce the
cognitive dissonance currently experienced when presented with gender
ambiguity or transgression. The advantage of approaching the reduction of
trans-phobia in this manner is that, inherent to this approach is not simply
legal acceptance through the granting of a right or other legal recognition
- although that too is an important by-product of this strategy - but also
the production of tolerance towards others through the promotion of greater
self-understanding.
Finally, on a very practical level, perhaps such legal measures would
do something to help a community of people who, in navigating even the
most mundane aspects of their lives, face barriers on a daily basis because
of their gender identity and/or expression. An expression that does not fit
neatly within the heavily policed norms delineated by a population, which
relies upon them in order to avoid the discomfort of arriving at a truer
understanding of what it means to be masculine or feminine or masculine
and feminine or feminine and masculine or neither.
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